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ABSTRACT 
The paper evaluates doctors’ widespread pay-related discontent, and doctors’ response 
through formal and informal action. In a context of authoritarian management and 
compliant trade unions, Chinese doctors can only have individual, subtle and informal 
confrontation. Meanwhile the doctors’ professional society is expanding its influence, 
showing a desire to develop doctors’ group identity and protect members’ interests 
more effectively. The research findings have wider implications for the 
conceptualization of skilled workers’ professional organizations, which may develop 
as important new actors in the Chinese industrial relations system. 
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Submerged discontent and institutions: doctors’ pay in Chinese 
hospitals 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines how the conflict between doctors1 and their employers over pay 
arises and is accommodated in two Chinese public hospitals in the context of health 
service marketization. As ‘a major source of contention in industrial relations’ 
(Marsden, 1983: 263), pay represents the basis of conflict of interests between 
workers who want to ‘work less’ for better pay and employers who want to ‘pay less’ 
for more work  (Gall and Hebdon, 2009: 591). For employees, conflict may be 
expressed by individuals alone or through collective action, and in organized or 
unorganized forms (Batstone, 1979). By analyzing doctors’ pay arrangements, I 
investigate the extent to which doctors in China take individual actions and the 
prospect for doctors’ collective organization.     
Hospital doctors are at centre stage of public healthcare systems as they are usually 
highly skilled practitioners and are vital for delivering the service. This is not only 
because doctors affect health service outcomes, drive hospitals’ performance and 
command a large share of the budget (Anand et al., 2008), but also due to the fact that 
doctors’ contribution to society cannot be easily replaced. In most Western countries, 
doctors have been granted certain privileges by society: ‘high pay, professional 
                                                        
1 Doctors in China usually refer to licensed medical practitioners in health services, including surgeons, 
dentists and some technical professionals. In this study, all doctors are form public hospitals where the 
majority of Chinese doctors are working. 
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powers (e.g. prescription control), and self-policing (e.g., control of entry into 
professional schooling, the so-called gatekeeping control)’ (Crum, 1991: 3). In China, 
however, traditionally doctors’ pay was based on an egalitarian principle with narrow 
differentials between different grades (Bloom et al., 2001), with little influence from 
trade unions.  
    Since China started radical transformation from a planned to a socialist market 
economy three decades ago, there have been substantial organizational reforms in 
China’s public health system. During China’s marketization process, the old iron rice 
bowl employment system has been eroded (Warner, 2004), and the state has placed 
priority on increasing the public sector’s economic efficiency (Taylor et al. 2003). 
Within the public healthcare system, the state has also tried to use market-oriented 
strategies to ease its financial burden and improve performance. On the other hand, 
there have been few studies investigating management-labour conflict in China’s 
health services, and much of the literature in this area is mainly interested in 
government macro health reform policies, with occasional focus on administrative 
and economic contributions by doctors’ bonus systems (for instance Pei et al., 2002 
and Liu et al., 2006). Therefore the following question arises: how is doctors’ 
discontent expressed within China’s current industrial relations framework? 
The paper begins by introducing the nature of pay in the public sector, 
accompanied with an examination of industrial conflict and its accommodation, with 
special attention to the issue of informal and unorganized employee behaviour. Then it 
describes the transformation of managing people and pay in Chinese health services. 
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After introducing the research methods, it analyzes the evidence which illustrates 
doctors’ pay in case study hospitals, and doctors’ formal and informal, or collective 
and individual, responses. The last two parts discuss the major findings and overall 
conclusions.  
 
PAY AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT   
As an on-going process of negotiation over the wage-effort bargain, pay has been 
characterized as the frontier of control which exists in all organizations (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004). In the public sector, for instance, pay usually exhibits a conflictual 
relationship as employees and their organizations constantly confront employers and 
the state with ‘a perpetual conflict’ over the distribution of pay (Allen, 1971: 39). On 
the other hand, the resolution of pay-related conflict is said to be the outcome of ‘a 
range of institutional, formal and informal rule-making processes’ (Grimshaw and 
Rubery, 2003: 56). For example in recent years, China has started to establish a new 
tripartite collective contract system to give unions some more roles on pay negotiation, 
although it is still a management-controlled model within a unitarist industrial 
relations system (Clarke et al., 2004). Essentially pay is a major source of industrial 
conflicts, and employees may have various types of response, including formal or 
organized resistance, and informal or unorganized action. 
    Formal and organized action in resolving industrial conflict is usually through 
employees’ organizations. When workers are collectively organized they will be able 
to depend on ‘formal and infrequently negotiated agreements for the bulk of their 
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earnings increases’ (Hyman, 1989: 25); and bargaining over pay is ‘often the line of 
least resistance for union representatives’ (ibid.: 26). Once conflict becomes 
institutionalized each party has to recognize the legitimacy of the other’s existence, as 
institutionalization involves some agreement or acceptance of certain ‘rules of the 
game’ as a framework of relationships (Batstone, 1979: 62). This is particularly 
significant for skilled workers such as doctors in Western countries, as their unions 
often show a strong bargaining power over pay-effort bargain. As Hyman (1989: 33) 
emphasizes, skilled workers often possess ‘a pride in their trade, a sense of 
community and commitment to common craft principles, which support powerful 
resistance to forms of managerial control which challenge their autonomy in the 
detailed performance of their work’. 
    Apart from organized actions, employees can always take informal and unorganized 
actions. Conflicts at work are not just as open struggle or clashes between workers 
and employers but also involve ‘more hidden tensions and frictions’ (Gall and Hebdon, 
2009: 589). If there is no basic consensus it is not easy for an institutional system to 
recognize and handle, and other forms of conflict expression will be common 
(Batstone, 1979). These alternative confrontations are often presented as 
individualistic, informal and unorganized workers’ behaviour, for instance sabotage, 
pilferage, absence or cheating, and they are said to be usually spontaneous and 
reactive (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004).  
    Different patterns of conflict and accommodation may co-exist, reflecting the 
dynamic development of employment relationship. Even in formally socialist 
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countries there are still formal industrial conflicts despite the state apparatus’ 
oppression of trade unions’ independent status, as organized resistance such as strikes 
and mass protest break from time to time (Edwards, 1986.: 305). In China, on the one 
hand, formal and organized confrontation between employees and employers is still 
less overt. Most employees’ responses to conflict are passive, such as labour turnover 
(Taylor et al., 2003). On the other hand, the level of industrial conflict in China has 
been rising in recent decades (Taylor 2000). Since the 1990s, there has been a rapid 
increase in sharp industrial relations conflicts, including strikes and demonstrations 
(though not allowed by the government), attracting increased attention from the 
government (Taylor et al. 2003). To some extent, increasing employee resistance does 
put Chinese employers under more pressure to improve the terms and conditions of 
the work, and public sector management may have to consider market-oriented 
payment schemes more carefully. Nonetheless, it is still difficult to provide a fair 
mechanism designed for resolving industrial conflicts under the current unitarist 
industrial relations system. Although China has official arbitration services and 
collective consultation mechanisms, much development is needed before conflicts can 
be accommodated through collective channels successfully (Clarke et al ., 2004). 
 
MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES IN CHINA’S PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICES  
By the end of 2007, China’s health services employed nearly 6 million staff, 
including 2 million doctors and 1.5 million nurses (Ministry of Health, 2008). With 
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such huge number of employees, government authorities face many complexities and 
difficulties in managing and paying health workers. In particular, the economic 
transformation has brought in dramatic challenges, including the collapse of 
traditional co-operative medicine, sharply reduced public health insurance coverage, 
and weakened patient affordability amid radically increased charges. To ease the 
pressure from public expenditure and to increase service efficiency, the government 
has been emphasizing the decentralization of planning and financing functions, 
introducing profit-making incentives and promoting diversified services (Wong and 
Chiu, 1997: 76). In doing so the state subsidy would ‘only cover part of the personnel 
wages and some new facility investments’ (ibid.: 81). Consequently the public health 
expenditure rate has dropped significantly (see table 1 below).  
 
Table 1: Health expenditure in China 
 1980 1990 2000 2006 
Total health expenditure 
      (100 million Yuan) 14.32 74.74 458.66 984.33 
Percentage of health expenditure 100% 100% 100% 100% 
    Government health expenditure 36.2% 25.1% 15.5% 18.1% 
    Social health expenditure 42.6% 39.2% 25.5% 32.6% 
    Personal health expenditure 21.2% 35.7% 59.05 49.3% 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2008 
 
   Table 1 demonstrates that in 2006 government investment was only 18.1% of the 
total health spending, while in 1980 the figure was 36.2% (Ministry of Health, 2008). 
On the other hand, the rate of individual health payment has increased dramatically 
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from 21.2% in 1980 to 49.3% in 2006 (ibid.). It is said that the Chinese government is  
responsible for most public hospitals’ wage bills due to fiscal decentralization, with 
the exception of basic salaries for a designated number of personnel (Liu, 2004: 536). 
In 2002 the government could only afford 6% to 7% of total hospital spending, while 
paying staff wages would cost 26% of the hospital budget (Ministry of Health, 2005). 
This in practice has forced hospital management to allocate health care resources 
having greater reliance on market environment, and maintaining qualified service 
despite the declining government funding (Pei et al., 2000). As a consequence, health 
workers’ payment has been inadequately connected with the effectiveness and quality 
of the medical service. Study has found that bonuses are widely used by almost all 
Chinese hospitals, with the revenue-related bonus depending on the income generated 
by doctors through provision of services and drugs over a revenue target (Liu et al., 
2006). The unbalanced pay system has led to a relatively low level of formal pay and 
heavy use of bonus systems, creating ‘a strong motivation on all staff to focus on 
revenue generation’ (Pei et al., 2000: 108). 
    Historically the political character of China’s pay policy was enhanced by the 
ideological significance of supporting a low salary and high welfare system (Verma 
and Yan, 1995). Under the iron-rice bowl principle, pay differentials between health 
workers with different grades were quite small, as egalitarianism was deployed in the 
public sector to ease conflict and maintain social stability (Cooke, 2004). After the 
economic reform, the commercialization of Chinese health services encourages 
hospital management to pay doctors according to their economic contributions, which 
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has widened the pay gaps between doctors in different departments and hospitals. 
There has been an increasing level of dissatisfaction among Chinese doctors due to 
unequal opportunities for pay between rural and urban, developed and under-
developed, regions (Lim et al., 2004). Therefore marketization has intensified the 
conflict over doctors’ pay, although the traditional iron-rice bowl system has not been 
completely replaced.   
    In recent decades, the significant liberalization of the economy has created the 
opportunity for Chinese organizations to adopt Western types of HRM (Rowley et al., 
2004). However the implementation of Western HR policies in China seems to be 
more ‘difficult in practice than in theory’ (Cooke, 2005: 19), and personnel reform in 
the public sector faces a number of challenges. For instance, the payment of public 
sector employees is still characterized by a relatively heavy proportion of bonuses in 
the total pay package and the residual egalitarian culture (Cooke, 2004). Moreover, 
pay arrangements in China are still largely determined by management discretion, 
because the ACFTU (All China Federation of Trade Unions, the only officially 
recognized union organization in China), the so-called ‘transmission belt’2, has not 
been legitimized to provide an effective channel through which ‘members can 
articulate their aspirations and express their grievances’ (Clarke et al., 2004: 251).   
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
                                                        
2 Transmission belt is used to signify the way in which Chinese trade unions act as a transmission belt 
between the Party-state and workers, transmitting policies to workers and reflecting workers’ opinion 
through ‘democratic management’ (White, 1996: 437). 
  11 
This research attempts to answer the following question:  How has marketization 
influenced the way that Chinese doctors express their discontent over pay? It deploys 
a case study approach and uses interviews and documents as major evidence. Two 
government hospitals were selected, one of which is in an urban area of Beijing and 
another is in a rural part of Guangdong province in the Southern part of China. The 
selection of these two hospitals is based on the following criteria: location, scale and 
access. Case study hospital A is a municipal city general hospital in Beijing, with a 
larger number of staff, better facilities and higher pay. Case study hospital B is a 
county general hospital in Guangdong, with a relatively lower level of pay and 
smaller number of doctors mainly serving the rural population. Given the 
development gap between capital Beijing and a remote county in Southern China, the 
two different cases allow a reasonable coverage of urban and rural possibilities on 
doctors’ pay.  
    During the fieldwork, 39 semi-structured interviews were conducted, including 24 
doctors, 5 managers and 3 full-time union officials in the case hospitals. In addition, 
two officials from doctors’ professional bodies were also interviewed. Other 
interviewees include health officials in the central and local government, health 
economists, and an official from the ACFTU and doctors’ professional bodies. 
Relevant documents were collected from the case study hospitals, government health 
authorities and trade unions. It has been argued that the reliability of official 
documents from Chinese government is ‘always problematic’ for political reasons 
(Shen, 2006: 349). Similarly the responses from interviewed officials and managers 
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need to be carefully interpreted as the official language might have prejudiced 
opinions. In addition, accurate interpretation is a key issue as all interviews were 
conducted in Chinese and the scripts need to be translated into English. The 
participants’ privacy and confidentiality has been respected.    
 
DOCTORS’ PAY IN THE CASE STUDY HOSPITALS  
Although the two hospitals are different in size and scale, evidence shows that the pay 
arrangements are generally the same. Doctors are paid a fixed reward according to 
their positions and years of service and a flexible reward which is mainly 
performance-related bonus (see Table 2 below). Like most Chinese medical 
institutions where bonuses are tied to revenues and profits for each department and 
doctor (Hsiao, 2008: 995), the two hospitals have prioritized economic targets. Some 
autonomy in personnel practices and financial responsibilities have been given to 
them so that they can have more freedom in managing employees. It is the hospital 
director who has the discretion to determine the internal pay distribution method, 
which will be normally accepted by the Party committee in which the hospital leaders 
are secretaries. Department directors have some authority to distribute some bonuses 
internally. 
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Table2: Internal payment distribution methods in two case hospitals 
    Case Hospital A Case Hospital B 
Pay structure Standard wage plus bonus  Standard wage plus bonus 
   Standard wage Fixed. Paid according to a 
national scale. 
Fixed. Paid according to a 
national scale. 
   Allowance Fixed with professional grade 
index 
Fixed with professional grade 
index 
   Bonus Flexible, linking to department 
income target and individuals’ 
professional grade index 
Flexible, liking to department 
income target and individuals’ 
professional grade index 
Bonus determinant Hospital management 
   Director and Party    
   Committee standing   
   member meeting 
Department directors 
Hospital management 
Party Branch Committee 
Standing Member Meeting 
 
Department directors 
Employee voice  No collective voice but doctors 
can talk to department leaders 
Workers’ Congress discussion 
(limited and symbolic). 
Communications with 
department directors 
Source: Fieldwork material  
 
    The determinants of doctors’ payments are illustrated in Table 3, showing how 
different elements contribute to total income, and how hospitals heavily rely on 
economic performance to motivate doctors. In these two hospitals, doctors’ total 
income comes from four main sources: standard wage, hospital allowance (including 
trade union benefit3), departmental bonus, and informal pay – red packets4 (see Table 
3 below). In addition to formal income paid by hospitals, extra payment is given to 
some doctors by patients. Over the years, doctors and nurses in key positions have had 
                                                        
3 As Chinese unions have welfare functions, sometimes trade unions distribute ‘union benefit’ (cash or 
domestic items), expressing unions’ care of members. In fact these beneficiary allowances are also 
from the hospital budget.   
4 It is a tradition that Chinese people give others gift money packed in a red envelope or packet to 
express good will. Red packets also refer to the money used for commission or bribery.  
 
  14
this unofficial income given by patients in order to ‘jump the queue or gain special 
services’ (Bloom et al., 2001: 29). Red packets are exchanged as an expression of 
mutual obligation, and commonly exist in many other monopoly public service 
providers.  
 
 
Table 3: Pay structure and determination for hospital doctors 
Factors Distributor Impact factor Nature 
Standard wage Hospital National income policy Fixed 
Hospital allowance Hospital Hospital revenue, local 
comparability and policy 
Slightly flexible 
    Union benefit 
   (also from hospital) 
ACFTU 
hospital 
branch  
Hospital budget Small amount 
Departmental bonus Hospital and 
department 
Hospital and Departmental 
 revenue; professional 
position and individual 
(economic) contribution  
Similar internal 
 distribution methods;  
various levels 
Informal income: 
red packets 
Patients Doctor’s skills and discipline, 
and hospital reputation 
Variable and secret 
Not everyone 
receives these 
Source: Fieldwork material 
 
Hospital management seems to be satisfied with doctors’ pay arrangements, by 
claiming that the current pay distribution methods have successfully motivated 
doctors. The Director of case study hospital A says that compared with the traditional 
‘iron rice bowl’ system, the new method can ‘break the egalitarianism’ and ‘encourage 
staff to make more contribution’. In an official document, case study hospital B says 
that ‘through personnel reform, especially the new payment system, our hospital 
appears to have a better teamwork spirit and coordination between the management 
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and staff, which have helped to improve the efficiency and quality of our service’ 
(Case Study Hospital B, 2005).  
By contrast, most doctors interviewed are not satisfied with their payment. Some 
doctors say their income is less than that of many other professionals in the public 
sector, such as the civil servants and university teachers. In general doctors in hospital 
A (in Beijing) have a higher level of pay than their counterparts in hospital B, 
showing a disparity between urban and rural areas. Within each hospital, pay levels 
vary between departments as their revenue differs. As Table 2 and Table 3 show, 
doctors’ fixed wages in both hospitals are paid according to a national scale, while 
departmental bonuses differ according to departmental and individual economic 
contributions to the hospital. It is understood that doctors’ fixed wages are kept as a 
generally stable amount of the salary in each month, which contributes to about 30 to 
50 per cent of total formal pay. Overall the ‘flexible’ part of the payment attracts more 
doctors’ attention, as they expect a higher level of bonus and a wider pay gap which 
could reflect the contribution of those in higher professional grades. Not surprisingly 
doctors in Orthopaedics and Surgical Departments have more bonuses since 
expensive operation fees can make a big contribution to departmental income. By 
contrast, in low-income departments such as Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) 
and the laboratory, doctors have fewer bonuses and therefore they have many 
complaints about the pay system. One Paediatrician in Hospital A describes his 
‘unfairly’ low pay:  
‘Our department’s monthly bonus is the lowest in the hospital, because our 
patients come here with minor illnesses and our prescription is usually 
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cheaper than some other departments. We are paid less since our service 
income is relatively low, which is unfair as our professional contribution is the 
same as that of others.’   
There are a few doctors who seem to be happy with the bonus system because they 
work in higher-income departments. But even in these ‘better’ departments, some 
doctors are not very satisfied with pay levels either, and also have other concerns. One 
Senior Consultant from Cardiovascular in Hospital A is concerned about his income, 
although his Department is believed to have higher bonuses due to expensive 
operation charges. He complains about the workloads and pressure:  
‘The income insufficiently reflects reward because doctors’ contribution is not 
simply the numbers of operations, but also a valuable work for a complicated 
human body. We work very hard while we have to face the challenge from 
some patients’ families who might misunderstand our work’.  
When doctors are facing unequal opportunities, their individual responses to market-
oriented bonus system vary considerably. These marked differences clearly fragment 
doctors’ collectives and are likely to obstruct the development of collective responses. 
 
DOCTORS’ RESPONSE IN CASE STUDY HOSPTIALS 
Evidently marketization has led to wide-spread discontent in both hospitals, as 
Chinese doctors are not happy with the unequal bonus distribution methods, the heavy 
workload and lack of recognition for their professional contribution. However 
doctors’ dissatisfaction can not be easily conveyed through formal, collective actions, 
e.g. trade unions. The doctors’ union, the ACFTU, is unable to represent its members, 
despite recent government initiatives encouraging the ACFTU to take on a more 
representative role in order to diffuse widespread social unrest. It has been proved that 
essentially the ACFTU is unable to respond to the demands of the situation.  
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The absence of ACFTU in organizing collective resistance 
Both case hospitals have ACFTU branches as trade union organizations and full-
time officials, but hospital unions are more like a management department in 
responsible for entertainment and welfare issues – a typical ‘Soviet’ type of union. 
There is hardly any employee involvement and little communication between 
management and doctors regarding their pay. As a surgical doctor in hospital B says, 
‘unions’ regular Workers Congress meetings only have symbolic meaning because big 
issues will be finally decided by our hospital leaders’. When there are grievances 
about pay, doctors do not ask unions for help, simply because the ACFTU is unable to 
provide such assistance. The ACFTU has acted ‘sometimes half-heartedly, 
inconsistently and not particularly effectively’ (Chan, 2000: 274). One doctor from 
hospital A says:  
‘I feel that the bonus distribution is unfair as it cannot rightly reflect my 
professional contribution as a senior consultant. But I would never speak to the 
union, because those people only do what hospital leaders tell them to do. They 
do not actually represent us.’ 
The doctor here is clearly expressing discontent. However he does not expect his 
grievances to be resolved collectively, as he understands the hospital union does not 
have any real power to take collective action. For instance in hospital B, employee 
voice can be heard through delegations of Workers’ Congress meeting (see Table 2, 
page 12); however this channel is not always meaningful because it is up to 
management whether doctors’ advices can be adopted (see Table 2, page 12).   
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The emergence of a doctors’ professional organization  
On the other hand, interesting evidence is found that doctors’ professional body, the 
Chinese Medical Doctors Association (CMDA), is expanding its influence. 
Established in 2002, the CMDA is aimed ‘to provide professional guidance on 
doctors’ service, self-discipline, coordination and supervision; to provide the 
evaluation of doctors’ professional qualifications’ (CMDA, 2007). The CMDA also 
has a self-regulatory role to look at doctors’ ethical issues. As a CMDA official 
interviewed says, ‘we are doctors’ own professional society which is devoted to 
protect doctors’ interests and to safeguard doctors’ career development and profession 
identity’.  
Another important function for the CMDA is to help doctors to advance their skill 
base and status, as well as to protect themselves, through education and training 
programmes. In general, educating members is ‘an important step in fostering the 
collectivist outlook that is often a critical precursor to unionization’ (Fiorito, 2002: 
630). Training is a potentially powerful vehicle to transform unions into more 
inclusive organizations with the ability to conceptualize a broader set of collective 
interests (Kirton and Healey, 2004). According to the CMDA official interviewed, the 
CMDA has called for educating doctors on how to avoid unnecessary medical 
disputes and protect their legal rights. In addition the official also says that the CMDA 
has asked the public ‘to give doctors more understanding about their unfair treatment, 
because prejudiced social opinion will worsen the ordinary medical environment’.   
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Many doctors in the two hospitals are members of the CMDA and another 
professional body, the Chinese Medical Association (CMA). Doctors in Beijing have 
more opportunities in taking part in CMDA events, since CMDA is less active in rural 
hospitals. Both societies are professional organizations and have no influence on 
hospital management at the moment, although the CMDA seems to be focusing on 
recruiting doctors and to be a closed society with highly skilled practitioners only. 
Membership expansion provides the CMDA with more collective power, because to 
achieve greater outcomes, unions need greater resources such as financial capital and 
human or physical capital (Fiorito et al., 2002). As a new society specifically for 
Chinese doctors, the CMDA differs from the ACFTU because members of CMDA 
come from a group of medical practitioners, whose common identity is characterized 
by high level of education and skills. Cregan et al. (2009) suggest that people wish to 
belong to a group that they perceive to be distinct from other groups in order to raise 
their self-esteem, as well as the regard of society and government. Doctors choose to 
join in the CMDA because membership can bring more training or academic 
exchange opportunities provided by the organization. These educational activities, 
such as a journal publication, training courses and conferences, can help build 
doctors’ professional identity and therefore provide important basis for employees’ 
resistance. As Kirton and Healey (2004) indicate, in employees’ professional 
organizations, the development of confidence through presentations and debate is part 
of the process of shared learning that enhances individuals’ potential contribution to 
collective organizations and actions. On the other hand, currently the CMDA has 
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nothing to do with doctors’ pay determination in the workplace. As a consultant from 
hospital A says:  
‘Becoming a CMDA member can help build my networks and improve skills 
by attending professional training. But I don’t think the CMDA could represent 
us to increase our income because at the moment only hospital leaders can 
decide our pay’. 
Professional network helps build important social capital that the CMDA provides for 
doctors to develop their group identity, which is the basis of employees’ collective 
organization. Even though the purposes of most conferences and trainings are 
academic or medical technique-oriented, members may take these opportunities to 
discuss doctors’ common issues such as professional ethics and the protection of 
rights. This platform provides doctors with a lot of opportunities to develop their 
social capital. As Cregan et al. (2009) note, the social identification with fellow 
members in the group is associated with individual workers’ collective behaviour, 
therefore the CMDA’s activities contain chances for doctors to build up social capital 
for organizing collectively. Gradually this informal collective organization may 
reinforce doctors’ common value with increased profile, influence and power in 
defending doctors’ own interests. As Hyman (1989: 34) argues, the occupational 
solidarity of privileged white-collar groups, reinforced by their dominant position, is 
able to protect ‘even incompetent individuals from the type of controls to which 
ordinary employees would be subject’. Nevertheless, the use of social capital to 
achieve improvements in workers’ situation through collective action depends on their 
own values and aspirations (Taylor, 2000). There are possibilities that new institutions 
may emerge, or alternatively, employees may take informal collective action.   
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Doctors’ informal response    
Because it is impossible for doctors to have genuine collective resistance, doctors’ 
discontent about their pay is more often expressed and handled through subtle and 
individual channels, including limited communication, turnover and informal payment. 
The first kind of individual response is that doctors can air their grievances to 
colleagues, and sometimes to lower ranking managers whose authority is limited. At a 
certain level doctors are allowed to make individual complaints through department 
managers, or Workers Congress meetings. As Taylor et al. (2003: 213) note, to some 
extent Chinese workers can ‘air grievances’ by using the more common complaint 
route of going through management. These complaints might be ignored by senior 
management in the end, but doctors do feel a bit comforted as they think at least 
somebody from management has listened to them. For instance, many doctors 
interviewed believe that they have many ‘common languages’ with the head of 
department, so doctors would like to exchange views with line managers rather than 
with hospital leaders. 
    The extent to which doctors can convey their dissatisfaction is constrained by 
management’s bureaucratic control. Evidence shows that hospital senior management 
lacks adequate contact with frontline employees, and personnel managers have little 
shop floor communication with doctors as well. As a Traditional Chinese Medicine 
consultant in hospital A points out, ‘Hospital leaders seldom come to speak to us in 
person or enquire about individual situations. We can usually see them speaking on 
the stage during hospital staff meetings’. Most doctors’ grievances are made through 
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department managers although their voices are usually ignored by hospital leaders. An 
ophthalmology consultant in case study hospital B says: ‘Although personnel cadres 
have little contact with us doctors, we sometimes can suggest that the (department) 
leader asks the hospital director to increase our bonus. Normally the leader is willing 
to pass our messages to senior management because he also has a similar interest’. In 
contrast, there are more channels that hospital senior management uses to make 
downwards communications, such as staff meetings or internal newsletters which can 
brief employees on policies from time to time.   
The second form of individual response is employee turnover, an alternative action 
for doctors to express their discontent. Leaving the job is one of the most direct ways 
of reacting to the dissatisfaction within the work situation (Rose 2001). Some doctors 
claim that they wish to leave the hospital, however quitting current posts means that 
doctors will not be able to air their grievances. Turnover will undermine doctors’ 
collective resistance, although it can bring concessions from management to reduce it. 
More grievances are found in hospital B than hospital A, as the county hospital has 
less incentive to retain doctors than its city rivals. To a large extent this is due to the 
unequal distribution of health resources between different geographic regions in 
China (Anand et al., 2008). When the situation is combined with the stressful 
environment and patients’ mistrust, things could become worse. Young doctors 
particularly feel strongly that their payment is too low and therefore they are under 
pressure to leave. A doctor from the Medical Department who has only worked three 
years complains: 
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‘I work so hard on extra hours and many night shifts, but one night shift’s 
allowance can only buy me a breakfast (laughing). My income of course is 
the lowest in the hospital. Why am I so young? … I also face huge pressure 
from the busy work and low pay. I am too busy to think about my future, 
although I admit that I have been considering going back to university to do 
a postgraduate degree programme.’  
The major reason for doctors thinking about leaving is pay; however it is not easy 
to leave because competition is quite high for posts in better hospitals where the pay 
and working conditions are much better. It is also hard for doctors to find a better job 
outside the health service. Nevertheless hospital management has realized the 
potential problem of staff turnover. As the personnel assistant in case study hospital A 
notes, there is pressure coming from those ‘talented personnel’ who have been trying 
to leave the hospital because of all kinds of reasons including payment’. 
The third type of individual resolution is informal payment, as some doctors take 
patients’ money secretly for exchange of providing quicker or better service. For 
instance, surgical and obstetrics doctors used to have more chances of being given red 
packets, since the risk of operations and helping pregnant women have made people 
believe that some extra money could lead to better treatment. As Table 3 (page 14) , 
indicates the amount of red packages are connected with doctors’ skills and discipline, 
and the hospital’s reputation. Moreover, not every doctor can be given red packets 
because ‘opportunities’ vary between different departments or between doctors with 
different professional grades. For instance surgery doctors have more chances being 
giving red packets than traditional Chinese medicine doctors. When patients are going 
to have surgical operations, they will be more likely to bribe doctors because the 
operations are more expensive and risky than herb prescriptions given by traditional 
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Chinese medicine doctors.  Because red packets are often secret and hard to estimate, 
doctors’ real income is not clear. Furthermore, red packets are an individual solution 
to a collective problem. This action may undermine the attempt at collective response, 
for instance the potential of developing a powerful organization for doctors 
themselves.   
When doctors are asked about this sensitive topic, most of them acknowledge the 
existence of informal pay ‘somewhere’ in hospitals, although none of them is willing 
to disclose how much he or she can usually get. In addition, not every doctor has the 
opportunity to be given informal pay by patients. For instance, one diabetes doctor 
from hospital B complains that he is unhappy to be in his current position, because the 
bonus is less and there is no chance to be given anything from patients. He also 
assumes that the surgical doctors are particularly well-paid through red packets. 
Interestingly some doctors admit that they have experiences of receiving ‘gifts’, but 
they indicate themselves as passive acceptors rather than demanders. As one radiology 
consultant in the same hospital declares, he has got ‘something’ from a patient, but he 
thinks that is realistic since the patient is a millionaire.   
    In public, hospital management seems to be firmly opposing red packets. The 
director of hospital A claims: ‘As a public hospital, we never allow doctors to accept 
patients’ money privately. We will give serious discipline to any doctors who receive 
red packets.’ However the existence of informal payments, as admitted by many 
doctors interviewed, indicates the ineffectiveness of management’s effort to eliminate 
this behaviour. Although red packets are expressively prohibited by the government, 
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actually offenders are not disciplined seriously by hospital management. As a 
consultant in hospital B says: ‘As long as red packets are not exposed by public media 
or nobody makes complaints about the issue, our leaders’ main concern is still about 
raising hospital’s income. Of course there are national and local publicity activities to 
call for eliminating this behaviour, but it is difficult to be completely implemented.’  
Clearly, the existence of red packets and managements’ public rejection of them as a 
way of working can be used by management as a latent tool for undermining the 
organization of doctors.  In short, doctors receiving them can always be ‘discovered’ 
to be doing so if they need to be disciplined.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Findings of this study illustrate that Chinese doctors are paid unevenly and most of 
them have been de-motivated by the market-oriented bonus distribution mechanism. 
As Table 1 (page 7) illustrates, reduced government responsibility for funding health 
services means that hospitals are forced to pursue a market-oriented pay strategy. 
Linking doctors’ pay with economic performance has made payment unequal, and out 
of line with their professional contribution. There is wide-spread dissatisfaction; 
however Chinese doctors cannot generate collective resistance like their counterparts 
in Western countries. The ACFTU is not a union with enough independent power, 
although doctors’ discontent may be expressed through other channels. As Clarke 
(2005) remarks, due to the political weakness of trade unions, Chinese workers’ 
interests cannot be easily defended by collective organizations. Chinese doctors, far 
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from achieving a degree of autonomy, are even more subordinated to hospital 
management than before as marketization has provided workplace managers with 
more authority.  
On the other hand, under-organized Chinese doctors do have responses. Their 
discontent on pay has been accommodated through individual actions such as limited 
communication on grievances, turnover and informal payment. In the case hospitals 
there is limited employee voice within departments or through Workers’ Congress 
meetings (see Table 3, page 14). Doctors do share their grievances with colleagues or 
talk to managers about their complaints, although this ‘employee voice’ channel is 
less meaningful. Some doctors have a turnover intention as an individual response to 
the conflict, despite the difficulties of using such an ‘exit mechanism’ in reality. 
Doctors also act like traditional employees who find individual ways to survive at 
work and supplement their income, in their case particularly through informal practice 
– red packets. As Chen (2007: 77) notes, there seem to be two options for 
contemporary Chinese workers – they become defenseless in the face of employers’ 
power, or they ‘have to fight for their rights as individuals’. While these subtle and 
unofficial behaviours have eased tension at workplace, management shows some 
extent of tolerance as long as doctors can make good contributions to the hospital. As 
Edwards (1988: 192) suggests, managers ‘do not just tolerate fiddles as constraints 
that they are forced to accept but also take them for granted as ways of getting work 
done’. Nevertheless, doctors’ individual solutions may undermine the attempt to 
develop formal, collective resistance, and employee turnover may weaken doctors’ 
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chance to exercise voice.   
    When collective solutions are denied, informal action may be the ‘only option 
available and as such the most rational thing to do’ (Blyton and Turnbull 2004: 258). 
In particular the red packets, as well as other forms of informal activities, are 
alternative solution for Chinese doctors to the conflict at work when collective 
solution is unavailable. Nonetheless, informal payment does give doctors some pay 
increase, albeit in a controversial and illegal way. This is not unusual in countries 
where there are corruptive practices in the public sector. In Russia, for example, there 
has been ‘thank you money’ for hospital doctors inherited from the Soviet era, as 
unofficial pay for service system is still common (Barr and Field, 1996). Similarly in 
many Eastern European countries, unofficial and informal payment has been found 
which provides ‘significant but possibly distorting contribution to health care 
financing’ (Ensor, 2004: 237). In addition, red packets have escalated pay disparities 
between doctors, as this study has found that there are ‘unequal opportunities’ for this 
kind of behaviour between different doctors. In this way, doctors’ individual and 
informal responses undermine the development of their collective organization.  
Despite the absence of independent trade unionism, there still have protections for 
workers rights in China (Shen 2006). The renewal of the Trade Union Law in 2001 
and the establishment of the new Labour Contract Labour in 2008 have provided 
Chinese unions with more active duties in protecting employees. As Zhao and Nichols 
(1996: 19) indicate, the economic reform has at the same time sharpened Chinese 
workers’ consciousness since ‘the advance of the market encourages workers to fight 
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for their pay, not just to wait as they did under the planned economy’. The increasing 
number of labour dispute in recent years brought by Chinese workers to arbitration 
commissions and courts reflects the growth of workers’ rights consciousness (Chen, 
2007). During a period of transformation, Chinese workers’ reactions to their 
discontent have become more diversified, like a number of different individual 
resolutions shown in this case study. Moreover, the marketization of doctors’ pay has 
intensified their conflicts with management, while the existing unorganized 
resolutions seem to be inadequate and there is a need for collective activity to 
accommodate these conflicts. .  
    Against this context, Chinese workers may try to ‘use their social capital as a basis 
to transform a common interest into collective action’ (Taylor et al., 2003: 342). To 
effectively defend their own interests, professional workers like Chinese doctors may 
need a good professional organization like the BMA in the UK, rather than a classical 
union like ACFTU that does not function properly. The expansion of a doctors’ 
professional organization, the CMDA, provides a new platform for Chinese doctors to 
develop their social capital and collective identity. As Chan (2000: 275) remarks, 
public sector workers in China are ‘better organized and educated and more aware of 
their rights’ and there are preconditions for collective bargaining. Once the CMDA 
can use its strength to increase the level of control in doctors’ training, education and 
the supply of the profession, it will have better position to mobilize members and to 
safeguard their interests. Where members see their organization as effective in 
improving work and employment conditions, collective action is more likely taken by 
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members (Buttigieg et al., 2008). Yet the prospect of change is likely to be subject to 
the extent to which the Communist regime will permit employees’ collective 
representation within current political framework.  
This research, an observation on conflict and resolution over doctors’ pay, provides 
a contribution to documenting employee resistance in contemporary Chinese health 
services. While most existing literature on management-labour conflicts in China 
focuses on enterprise workers and the role of ACFTU – a residual collective 
organization (For example Taylor, 2000; Clarke, 2005), this study offers an insight 
into medical practitioners’ informal response and the emergence of a new collective 
organization – doctors’ professional society the CMDA. The research findings have 
wider implications for understanding alternative channels for employees’ discontent 
in China, and there is a scope for further study of the role of skilled workers’ 
professional organizations. These societies may develop as an important new actor in 
the Chinese industrial relations system in the near future.  
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